The Role of Mental Representation in Social Development

In this article we focus on a major advance of the past few decades: the introduction of mental representation as a tool for understanding social development. We argue that despite the considerable contributions made by this approach, it is underrepresented in social developmental research, except in the area of attachment. We go on to show that mental representations (1) play a key role in the social and self-related outcomes researchers value most highly, (2) are the carriers of socialization experience and a major means through which experience affects children’s outcomes, (3) have unique implications for pinpointing important socialization practices and designing effective interventions, and (4) can link social development to other areas in psychology. We also suggest, along with other recent authors, that mental representations hold the key to understanding the important issue of continuity and change in development

Student engagement is key to broadening participation in CS

© 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. The Mobile CS Principles (Mobile CSP) course is one of the NSF-supported, College Board-endorsed curricula for the new Computer Science Principles AP course. Since 2013, the Mobile CSP project has trained more than 700 teachers, and the course has been offered to more than 20,000 students throughout the United States. The organizing philosophy behind the Mobile CSP course is that student engagement in the classroom is the key to getting students, especially those traditionally underrepresented in CS, interested in pursuing further study and careers in CS. The main strategies used to engage Mobile CSP students are: (1) a focus on mobile computing throughout the course, taking advantage of current student interest in smartphones; (2) an emphasis on getting students building mobile apps from day one, by utilizing the highly accessible App Inventor programming language; and (3) an emphasis on building creative,\u27socially useful\u27 apps to get students thinking about ways that computing can help their communities. In this paper we present and summarize two years of data of various types (i.e., student surveys, teacher surveys, objective assessments, and anecdotal reports from students and teachers) to support the hypothesis that engagement of the sort practiced in the Mobile CSP course not only helps broaden participation in CS among hard-to-reach demographics, but also provides them with a solid grounding in computer science principles and practices

Children's Responses to Group-Based Inequalities: Perpetuation and Rectification

The current studies investigate whether, and under what conditions, children engage in system-perpetuating and system-attenuating behaviors when allocating resources to different social groups. In three studies, we presented young children with evidence of social group inequalities and assessed whether they chose to perpetuate or rectify these inequalities. Children (aged 3.5–11.5 years) heard about two social groups (i.e., racial or novel groups) whose members received resources unequally (two cookies versus one). Participants were then given the opportunity to distribute additional resources to new members of the same groups. In Experiment 1, when children were presented with inequalities involving groups of Blacks and Whites, older children (aged 7.5–11.5 years) rejected the status quo, providing more resources to members of groups with fewer resources (White or Black), whereas younger children (aged 3.5–7.5 years) perpetuated the status quo. In Experiments 2 and 3, the inequalities involved Asians and Whites and novel groups. Children of all ages perpetuated inequality, with rectification strategies applied only by older children and only when Black targets were involved in the inequality. Equal sharing occasionally occurred in older children but was never a common response. These findings provide evidence that system-perpetuating tendencies may be predominant in children and suggest that socialization may be necessary to counter them.Psycholog

Judgements of the Lucky Across Development and Culture

For millennia human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his/her evaluation, reward and punishment. In a series of studies we investigate whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first three studies demonstrate that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next three studies demonstrate that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final two studies find that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to Lerner’s just world theory and Piaget’s immanent justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes.Psycholog

Weight Beliefs and Messages: Mindsets Predict Body-Shame and Anti-Fat Attitudes via Attributions

In two samples (N=247, N= 291), we examined the link between beliefs and messages about the changeable (incremental theory) vs. fixed (entity theory) nature of weight, attributions for weight, and body shame. We recruited participants using online sampling, employing a correlational design in Study 1 and an experimental design in Study 2. Across both studies, we found evidence for the stigma-asymmetry effect—incremental, relative to entity beliefs/messages of weight predicted both (a) stronger onset responsibility attributions, indirectly increasing body shame and (b) stronger offset efficacy attributions, indirectly decreasing body shame. Study 2 replicated the stigma-asymmetry effect with anti-fat attitudes. We discuss implications for public health obesity messages with the goal of reducing stigma

Beliefs about emotion: links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress

People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed (entity theorists), whereas others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions (incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating (a) entity beliefs are associated with lower well-being and increased psychological distress, (b) people's beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people's implicit beliefs—particularly about their own emotions—may predispose them toward emotion regulation strategies that have important consequences for psychological health

The Role of Forgetting in Undermining Good Intentions

Evaluating others is a fundamental feature of human social interaction–we like those who help more than those who hinder. In the present research, we examined social evaluation of those who not only intentionally performed good and bad actions but also those to whom good things have happened (the lucky) and those to whom bad things have happened (the unlucky). In Experiment 1a, subjects demonstrated a sympathetic preference for the unlucky. However, under cognitive load (Experiment 1b), no such preference was expressed. Further, in Experiments 2a and 2b, when a time delay between impression formation (learning) and evaluation (memory test) was introduced, results showed that younger (Experiment 2a) and older adults (Experiment 2b) showed a significant preference for the lucky. Together these experiments show that a consciously motivated sympathetic preference for those who are unlucky dissolves when memory is disrupted. The observed dissociation provides evidence for the presence of conscious good intentions (favoring the unlucky) and the cognitive compromising of such intentions when memory fails

Emotion beliefs and cognitive behavioural therapy for social anxiety disorder

Despite strong support for the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for social anxiety disorder (SAD), little is known about mechanisms of change in treatment. Within the context of a randomized controlled trial of CBT, this study examined patients' beliefs about the fixed versus malleable nature of anxiety-their 'implicit theories'-as a key variable in CBT for SAD. Compared to waitlist (n = 29; 58% female), CBT (n = 24; 52% female) led to significantly lower levels of fixed beliefs about anxiety (Mbaseline = 11.70 vs. MPost = 7.08, d = 1.27). These implicit beliefs indirectly explained CBT-related changes in social anxiety symptoms (κ(2) = .28, [95% CI = 0.12, 0.46]). Implicit beliefs also uniquely predicted treatment outcomes when controlling for baseline social anxiety and other kinds of maladaptive beliefs (perceived social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs). Finally, implicit beliefs continued to predict social anxiety symptoms at 12 months post-treatment. These findings suggest that changes in patients' beliefs about their emotions may play an important role in CBT for SAD

Implicit Theories: Elaboration and Extension of the Model

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